{"id":3359,"date":"2024-03-27T23:46:53","date_gmt":"2024-03-27T23:46:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/ccnr.thedev.ca\/?page_id=3359"},"modified":"2024-03-29T14:20:35","modified_gmt":"2024-03-29T14:20:35","slug":"the-mox-experience-the-disposition-of-excess-russian-and-u-s-weapons-plutonium-in-canada","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/ccnr.thedev.ca\/fr\/the-mox-experience-the-disposition-of-excess-russian-and-u-s-weapons-plutonium-in-canada\/","title":{"rendered":"THE MOX EXPERIENCE: THE DISPOSITION OF EXCESS RUSSIAN AND U.S. WEAPONS PLUTONIUM IN CANADA"},"content":{"rendered":"

THE MOX EXPERIENCE:<\/span><\/h1>\n

 <\/p>\n

THE DISPOSITION OF EXCESS RUSSIAN
\nAND U.S. WEAPONS PLUTONIUM IN CANADA<\/span><\/strong><\/h2>\n

 <\/p>\n

J u l y \u00a0\u00a0\u00a01 9 9 7<\/small><\/h4>\n
Part One<\/span><\/big><\/h6>\n
\n

Franklyn Griffiths<\/a><\/h3>\n

George Ignatieff Chair of Peace and Conflict Studies
\nUniversity College, University of Toronto
\n15 King’s College Circle
\nToronto, Ontario\u00a0M5S 3H7<\/small><\/h4>\n
tel\u00a0(416) 978-7417<\/small>\u00a0fax\u00a0(416) 971-2027<\/small><\/h6>\n
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TABLE OF CONTENTS<\/h2>\n

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 <\/p>\n

Summary<\/a><\/h3>\n

Foreword<\/a><\/p>\n

Introduction<\/a><\/p>\n

1. The Proposition<\/a><\/p>\n

1.1. Proposal and Process<\/a><\/p>\n

1.2. Selling Points<\/a><\/p>\n

1.3. Proponents<\/a><\/p>\n

2. The Alternatives<\/a><\/p>\n

2.1. Immobilization-Only<\/a><\/p>\n

2.2. S-8 Hybrid<\/a><\/p>\n

2.3. Trilateral Hybrid<\/a><\/p>\n

3. International Security Benefits<\/a><\/p>\n

3.1. Nuclear Non-proliferation<\/a><\/p>\n

3.2. Nuclear Disarmament<\/a><\/p>\n

3.3. Net Worth<\/a><\/p>\n

4. Direct Benefits and Costs to Canada<\/a><\/p>\n

4.1. Security and Safety<\/a><\/p>\n

4.2. Financial<\/a><\/p>\n

4.3. Governance<\/a><\/p>\n

5. Conclusions and Recommendations<\/a><\/p>\n

Notes<\/a><\/p>\n

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SUMMARY<\/h2>\n

The\u00a0CANDU MOX<\/small>\u00a0initiative is a Canadian proposal to assist the Russian Federation and the United States in relieving themselves of a combined amount of up to\u00a0150\u00a0<\/small>tonnes of weapons plutonium. This material has been rendered excess to the defence needs of the two countries as a result of the end of the Cold War and various nuclear arms reduction agreements.<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

The proposal originates with the Canadian nuclear industry. It would have Russia and the\u00a0U.S.<\/small>\u00a0each blend some of their weapons plutonium, amounts yet to be determined, in oxide form with uranium oxide, and to send the mixed oxide (MOX<\/small>) as nuclear reactor fuel to Canada. There it would be irradiated to produce electricity in\u00a0CANDU<\/small>\u00a0reactors at the Bruce nuclear generating station on the shore of Lake Huron about\u00a0300<\/small>\u00a0km north of Detroit over a period of up to\u00a025\u00a0<\/small>years, and then held in Ontario in the form of spent reactor fuel for ever.<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

The\u00a0CANDU MOX<\/small>\u00a0initiative is presented as a swords-into-ploughshares venture that would first convert megatonnes of destructive potential into megawatts of socially useful electricity, and then secure the waste in Canada in perpetuity so that the plutonium remaining in it could never be used again for military purposes by the two principals, or be diverted to potential nuclear-weapons states or terrorist organizations.
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The\u00a0CANDU MOX<\/small>\u00a0initiative has the informal backing but not the firm support of the Canadian government. Ottawa is assessing the international and national value of the undertaking before it decides whether or not to commit firmly to the proposal as a means of excess weapons plutonium disposition. Since plutonium, with its immense radioactive longevity and carcinogenic quality can not be ”disposed of,” the term ”disposition” is used here with its connotation of moving plutonium from one place to another without ever actually getting rid of it.
\n<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

This study recommends that the Canadian government refuse to give the\u00a0CANDU MOX<\/small>\u00a0initiative its support any longer, and that the proposal be consigned to oblivion.
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If implemented, the initiative would impose direct and substantial security, safety, financial, and governance costs on Canadians and on Ontarians in particular. At the same time, the nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament benefits of the initiative, which are presented as its principal advantages, prove to be woefully inadequate. When implementation of the\u00a0CANDU MOX<\/small>\u00a0initiative is not ineffective for purposes of nuclear non-proliferation, it is actually counterproductive.<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

As to nuclear disarmament, the initiative holds little or no promise of making the world a safer place when the Russian Federation and the United States are determined, as they are, to retain the potential to resurrect their Cold War strategic nuclear arsenals. An undertaking that would produce substantial direct costs to Canadians and would yield no offsetting benefits for international peace and security is not in the public interest.<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

Giving careful consideration to the interplay of political, technological, and financial considerations among the leading Western states and the Russian Federation over excess weapons plutonium disposition, this study also finds that the\u00a0CANDU MOX<\/small>\u00a0initiative is a viable proposition when viewed solely in terms of its international negotiability. It is viable internationally mainly because Canadian-based reactor disposition offers part of the answer to Russia’s lack of nuclear reactors that can be made safe for weapons\u00a0MOX<\/small>\u00a0use.<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

Not only would implementation of the\u00a0CANDU MOX<\/small>\u00a0initiative be detrimental to the Canadian interest, but the initiative could be taken up by the\u00a0G-7<\/small>\u00a0and Russia (now the\u00a0S-8<\/small>) as early as the end of\u00a01998\u00a0<\/small>, if the United States were to hold to its decision to select from among its disposition options by that time.<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

Were the Canadian offer to be picked up, Canadians would absorb the direct costs of\u00a0CANDU MOX<\/small>\u00a0implementation, and would make an international contribution not so much to peace and security as to the smooth functioning of the\u00a0S-8<\/small>\u00a0as an institution. This would not be worth the cost.<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

If the\u00a0CANDU MOX<\/small>\u00a0initiative is so inept and unfortunate as it stands, might it nevertheless be improved upon? This study concludes that when the Canadian government of the day has seen fit to give its informal backing to a poorly framed venture of the Canadian nuclear industry, there is little likelihood of Ottawa making the abrupt turnabout required to safeguard the initiative against its own inadequacies.<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

This study therefore recommends that the\u00a0CANDU MOX<\/small>\u00a0initiative be rejected outright by Canadians and rejected forthwith by the Canadian government.<\/b><\/p>\n

If the Canadian government opts to move forward with the initiative,\u00a0<\/span><\/b>21<\/small>\u00a0changes<\/a>\u00a0are proposed to reduce the damage that would be done to Canadians and Ontarians, and to strengthen the initiative’s potential to make an authentic contribution to international peace and security.<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

The first few of these suggest that the government distance itself from the reactor preferences of the Canadian nuclear industry, do what it can for the immobilization option, and, if that cannot be fully sustained, incorporate the underlying principles of immobilization into a vigorous effort to resist the further spread of civil plutonium fuel-cycle technology.<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

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Foreword<\/h2>\n

The George Ignatieff Chair of Peace and Conflict Studies was established at University College in the University of Toronto in May\u00a01996<\/small>. Named in honour of a distinguished Canadian diplomat and, later, peace activist, the Chair supports public understanding and research on questions of international peace and security. The holder of the Chair is Franklyn Griffiths, a University of Toronto political scientist with scholarly and policy interests in Russia, arms control, and Arctic affairs.<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

The first act of the Chair was to arrange for a meeting between Canadian stakeholders in the proposal, announced by the Prime Minister in April\u00a01996<\/small>, to relieve the Russian Federation and the United States of some of their excess weapons plutonium. This would be done by transporting the plutonium in mixed oxide (MOX<\/small>) form to Canada, irradiating it as fuel in\u00a0CANDU<\/small>\u00a0reactors at the Bruce nuclear generating station in Ontario on the shore of Lake Huron, and then holding the waste in perpetuity in Canada.<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

Needless to say, there was plenty of interest in the meeting. It was held as a stakeholders’ retreat, October\u00a017-18, 1996<\/small>, at the Hockley Valley Resort and Conference Centre, outside Toronto. The exchange among about\u00a050\u00a0<\/small>participants was intense, at times impassioned. Everyone present learned from it. Certainly I did. A summary account of the discussion, written by Peter Gizewski and entitled,\u00a0<\/span>”The\u00a0CANDU MOX\u00a0<\/small>Initiative: Report on a Stakeholders’ Debate,”\u00a0is available on request from the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development,\u00a0125<\/small>\u00a0Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Canada\u00a0K1A 0G2<\/small>.<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

The present study seeks to evaluate the\u00a0CANDU MOX<\/small>\u00a0initiative in its major dimensions as of July\u00a01997<\/small>. Thanks are owed to Irene Koch of the Nuclear Awareness Project, and to Norm Rubin of Energy Probe, who were kind enough to critique an earlier version of this piece which was also circulated to officials. I however take full responsibility for all errors of commission and omission which may be found here.<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

F. G.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

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INTRODUCTION<\/h2>\n


\n<\/span>Plutonium divides opinion. Occurring only very rarely in nature, it can be produced in large quantities when uranium is transmuted in nuclear reactors. It can then be separated from spent reactor fuel and reused for the generation of electricity, or employed to form the “pit” at the centre of a nuclear weapon.<\/p>\n

Not only can plutonium be used for both civil and military purposes, but you can’t have the one without inviting some of the other. The more widespread the commercial use of plutonium in the generation of electricity or heat, the greater the risk of some amount falling into the hands of those bent on weapons use. Conversely, the more intensive the weapons application, the better the context for civil use.<\/p>\n

In a weapon, plutonium is capable of unleashing instant and all but unimaginable physical destruction. Disseminated into the environment as the result of a weapons detonation or failure of technology and procedures associated with civil use, it is carcinogenic in the extreme when the minutest particle is inhaled. It is also persistent in the extreme: let loose or carefully secured at a disposal site, its isotopes have half-lives averaging in the thousands of years — actually ranging from\u00a014<\/small>\u00a0to as long as\u00a0370,000<\/small>\u00a0years.<\/p>\n

Large numbers of people in many countries are understandably horrified at the thought of increased reliance on civil, to say nothing of military, plutonium. From this standpoint, plutonium is indeed “the pits.” And yet there are also those, governments included, who view this element as the most economic and environmentally responsible energy source now available when all due safeguards are put in place and maintained.<\/p>\n

Following a variety of procedures which are referred to broadly as the closed or plutonium fuel cycle, plutonium is separated from spent uranium reactor fuel in an operation called reprocessing, and then fabricated into new fuel comprised of mixed uranium and plutonium oxides. The mixed oxide (MOX<\/small>) fuel is then irradiated or burned in a reactor, the spent fuel reprocessed for recovery of plutonium, and additional uranium added to the recovered plutonium to make new\u00a0MOX<\/small>, which is then burned over and over again in a cycle. At each step — irradiation, reprocessing, and renewed irradiation — nuclear waste is produced. The closed or plutonium fuel cycle, it should be noted, is distinct from a “once-through” cycle in which fresh reactor fuel is irradiated, not reprocessed, and retained in waste form. Use of the plutonium fuel cycle is said to yield cheap and safe energy capable of greatly reducing the volume of greenhouse gasses in an era when the developed countries must lower their emissions if poorer nations are, as seems likely, to increase theirs.<\/p>\n

Today, in Belgium, France, Germany, Japan, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, and other countries including Canada, the civil nuclear industry and its supporters are looking to make good on the potential of plutonium fuel-cycle technology. They are doing so in a context of mounting reserves of civil plutonium in Europe, and of steadily diminishing public and investor support for the nuclear energy option in most of the industrial economies.<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, events marking the end of the Cold war, most notably the\u00a0START I<\/small>\u00a0and\u00a0START II<\/small>\u00a0nuclear disarmament agreements struck by Moscow and Washington in\u00a01991<\/small>\u00a0and\u00a01993<\/small>, have served to create large and growing stockpiles of excess weapons plutonium from the pits of retired and dismantled strategic nuclear warheads in the two countries. Until recently, Russia and the United States were thought likely to have assembled at least\u00a050\u00a0<\/small>metric tons of surplus weapons plutonium each as of the year\u00a02003<\/small>, and very likely considerably more on the Russian side, as they followed through on the two\u00a0START<\/small>\u00a0treaties and completed the dismantlement of thousands of nuclear warheads designated as no longer required for defence purposes.<\/p>\n

Pits derived from the two countries’ strategic nuclear warheads are not however directly governed by treaty. The existing\u00a0START<\/small>\u00a0agreements, the second of which is yet to be ratified by the Russian Duma, specified sweeping destruction of launchers and downloading of warheads from launchers, but left disposition of the excess plutonium for future consideration by the parties.<\/p>\n

Whatever the fears and hopes that currently surround reliance on plutonium as a civil energy source, awareness has grown that reliable means must be devised for the safe disposition of the Russian and\u00a0U.S.<\/small>\u00a0weapons plutonium excess. Russia’s circumstances being what they are, Western and especially\u00a0U.S.<\/small>\u00a0financial and technical assistance are bound to figure heavily in the Russian Federation’s disposition effort. Moscow and Washington are actively considering the matter, as is the\u00a0G-7<\/small>\u00a0group of leading industrial states following their nuclear safety and security summit meeting of April\u00a01996<\/small>\u00a0in Moscow, which included discussions with the Russian President.<\/p>\n

There is general agreement among the\u00a0G-7<\/small>, and with the Russians as well in their political or “P-8<\/small>” and now Summit Eight or “S-8<\/small>” association with the Seven, that the problem of excess Russian and\u00a0U.S.<\/small>\u00a0weapons plutonium must be resolved without delay. It must be resolved if the benefits of nuclear disarmament are to be “locked in,” and if the particular weaknesses of the Russian custodial system are not to result in the diversion of weapons plutonium into the hands of potential nuclear-weapons states and terrorist organizations. Enter Canada.<\/p>\n

Speaking at the\u00a01996<\/small>\u00a0Moscow summit meeting, Prime Minister Jean Chr\u00e9tien announced that Canada was in principle willing to dispose of the Russian and\u00a0U.S.<\/small>\u00a0excess. As subsequently elaborated, the offer was essentially this: some\u00a0100\u00a0<\/small>tonnes of their surplus would be fabricated into\u00a0MOX<\/small>\u00a0fuel at facilities in the Russian Federation and in the United States or possibly in Western Europe, and then transported to Canada where over a period of up to\u00a025\u00a0<\/small>years it would be disposed of in\u00a0CANDU<\/small>\u00a0civil power reactors at Ontario Hydro’s Bruce nuclear generating station on the shore of Lake Huron roughly\u00a0300<\/small>\u00a0km north of Detroit.<\/p>\n

In truth, there is no “disposing of” or “getting rid of” plutonium, what with its extreme toxicity and immense radioactive longevity. Nor can it be safely lifted off the planet or, as yet, transmuted into short-lived isotopes. Hence the use throughout this study of the awkward word “disposition,” with its connotation of moving material from one place to another without actually disposing of it. To be precise, then, Canada’s idea was and is to subject\u00a0MOX<\/small>\u00a0fuel made from excess Russian and\u00a0U.S.<\/small>\u00a0weapons plutonium to “once-through” reactor irradiation which would serve not only to produce electricity, but to\u00a0embed<\/b>\u00a0the Russian and\u00a0U.S.<\/small>\u00a0excess in radioactive waste which would be secured forever so that no one could ever get at it again.<\/p>\n

Though Ontario Hydro would consume weapons\u00a0MOX<\/small>\u00a0and then retain the spent fuel in perpetuity, it would enter into contracts for\u00a0MOX<\/small>\u00a0fuel supply with Russian and\u00a0U.S.<\/small>\u00a0agencies only if the cost were competitive with that for natural uranium fuel normally used in\u00a0CANDU<\/small>\u00a0reactors. As to the Canadian government, it would not subsidize the supply of\u00a0MOX<\/small>, whose cost would have to be borne by others, and would insist that approval to proceed in Canada be governed by the full array of nuclear-physics, health, safety, and environmental assessments mandated by federal and provincial law.[1<\/small><\/a>]<\/p>\n

The\u00a0CANDU MOX<\/small>\u00a0initiative was framed from its beginnings as a swords-into-ploughshares contribution to international peace and security. As the Prime Minister put it in Moscow,<\/p>\n

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“What is worrying is that [excess weapons plutonium] could still be used in unwanted or undesirable ways….\u00a0CANDU<\/small>\u00a0is the reactor that could use it in the most efficient and useful way. We should assume our responsibility.”[2<\/small><\/a>]<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Subsequent statements from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade presented the venture as a safe and efficient means of turning vastly destructive material to productive social and economic use.[3<\/small><\/a>]<\/p>\n

Canada was volunteering to ensure that surplus Russian and\u00a0U.S.<\/small>\u00a0military plutonium would never be returned to weapons use by those two states, or turned to weapons use by other states and non-state entities as a consequence of nuclear leakage from Russia in particular. Canada was offering to help convert military into civil plutonium for the benefit of all, provided that others carried all of the financial burden.<\/p>\n

There was something odd about this. As a\u00a0G-7<\/small>\u00a0member, Canada might have undertaken to bear some of the shared cost of disposition unless it were making a sacrifice for the common good. But, as presented, the\u00a0CANDU MOX<\/small>\u00a0initiative entailed no sacrifice to Canadians.<\/p>\n

There was also an oddity in the Canadian government’s stance on the proposal. Despite the Prime Minister’s words of approval and significant behind-the-scenes support for the venture from federal departments, the government did not formally commit itself to the proposal. Instead, Ottawa portrayed it as a promising idea which had been brought to its attention by others and was worthy of international consideration. Canada had thus<\/p>\n